General background
In the last decades various axiomatic theories of truth have been proposed in the literature.
1 One of the main research topics in the area has been that of assessing their strength. Ideally, such an assessment should permit us to compare theories, that is, to answer questions of the form 'Is a theory T h 1 stronger or weaker than T h 2 ?'. However, such comparisons are not always straightforward and in some cases even the measure of strength to be used is not obvious at all.
The simplest comparisons can be carried out in terms of inclusion. Thus, we can say that T h 2 is not weaker than T h 1 iff T h 1 ⊆ T h 2 (T h 2 is strictly stronger than T h 1 if the inclusion is proper).
2 This, however, is a crude measure, as it does not permit us to compare theories for which no such simple inclusions hold.
Axiomatic theories of truth discussed in the literature are often built over some arithmetical base theory playing the role of the theory of syntax. Such a perspective will be adopted also in this paper: all the truth theories which we discuss will be obtained by extending Peano arithmetic with some axioms employing the new predicate 'T (x)' (the truth predicate). In view of this, another useful measure of strength, often discussed in the literature, is provided by comparing sets of arithmetical consequences of theories. In effect, when employing it, we compare not truth theories taken as wholes but their arithmetical content only. From this point of view, for example, the classical compositional typed truth theory CT − turns out to be equally strong as UT B, since both theories have exactly the same arithmetical consequences even though their truth axioms are quite different.
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A still subtler measure of strength has been proposed by Fujimoto (2010) , who introduced the following notion of relative truth-definability.
Definition 1 Let T h 1 and T h 2 be theories in one and the same language L T containing the predicate 'T (x)' called 'the truth predicate'. We say that T h 1 is relatively truth-definable in T h 2 (or T h 2 defines the truth predicate of T h 1 ) iff there is a formula θ(x) ∈ L T such that for every ψ ∈ L T , if T h 1 ⊢ ψ, then T h 2 ⊢ ψ(θ(x)/T (x)).
The expression 'ψ(θ(x)/T (x))' stands for the result of substituting the formula θ for all the occurrences of 'T ' in ψ.
It is easy to observe that if T h 2 defines the truth predicate of T h 1 , then T h 2 is arithmetically at least as strong as T h 1 . However, truth-definability is a stricter relation and it gives us more than mere comparisons of arithmetical strength. When employing the notion of truth-definability, we take into account not only the arithmetical, but also the truth-theoretic content of theories. Indeed, if T h 2 defines the truth predicate of T h 1 , then T h 2 contains the resources permitting us to reproduce the very notion of truth characterised by the axioms of T h 1 . In effect, we can claim that in such a case T h 2 is at least as strong as T h 1 not just arithmetically but also conceptually.
The aim of this paper is to compare the conceptual strength of two axiomatic theories of truth. The first of these is KF -a theory designed to capture Kripke's fixed-point model construction based on the Strong Kleene evaluation schema. The second theory is W KF , which closely resembles KF , except that it is designed to capture the fixed-point construction based on the Weak Kleene evaluation schema. We assume that both theories are formulated in the language L T , which is obtained from the arithmetical language by adding a new one-place predicate 'T (x)'.
4 Both theories contain Peano arithmetic (P A) together with induction for the full language with the truth predicate.
3 Namely, both of them are conservative over Peano arithmetic. For the definition of CT − and its conservativity over P A, see (Cieśliński, 2017, p. 107ff ) (the proof presented there is an adaptation of the construction of Enayat and Visser (2015) ).
4 For a fuller discussion of the resources of the arithmetical part of L T , we refer the reader to the final paragraphs of Section 2.
For the list of axioms of KF , the reader is referred to (Halbach, 2011, p. 201) ; following Halbach, we will denote them as kf1-kf13. Before defining the set of axioms of W KF , we adopt the following abbreviations.
• Sent L T is the set of sentences of L T .
• Let ϕ ∈ Sent L T . Then 'D(ϕ)' ('x is determined') is the formula:
'T (ϕ) ∨ T (¬ϕ)'.
• Let ϕ(x) be a formula of L T with one variable free. Then 'D(ϕ(x))' is the formula: '∀x T (ϕ(x)) ∨ T (¬ϕ(x)) '.
•
In Weak Kleene logic a compound formula will have a determinate truth value (truth or falsity) only if its constituents are also determined. This insight gives rise to the following axiomatisation of the truth theory W KF , based on Weak Kleene logic.
Definition 2 Axioms wkf1-wkf4, wkf7-wkf8 and wkf11-wkf13 of W KF are exactly the same as kf1-kf4, kf7-kf8 and kf11-kf13; see (Halbach, 2011, p. 201) . We list below only those axioms of W KF which differ from the corresponding axioms of KF .
2 State-of-the-art and motivations
Theories of truth based on Weak Kleene logic have been investigated in the literature from two angles. One important source is the paper of Cain and Damnjanovic (1991) , which describes some striking differences between the Strong Kleene and the Weak Kleene evaluation schemata in Kripke's model-theoretic constructions (the paper does not discuss axiomatic truth theories). Another key source is (Fujimoto, 2010) , where the discussion focuses on axiomatic theories of truth, with several results about W KF being presented.
Starting from the model-theoretic approach, below we sketch the wellknown constructions which KF and W KF have been designed to capture. In what follows Q ∈ {∃, ∀} and • ∈ {∧, ∨}. The expression 'Q d ' ('• d ') stands for the dual quantifier (dual binary connective): Q d is ∃ if Q is the universal quantifier and it is the universal quantifier otherwise (similarly,
c is the set of constant terms. The next two definitions characterise the notions of Strong Kleene and Weak Kleene Kripke's jump.
Definition 3 (Strong Kleene Jump) Let S ⊆ ω. We define:
For a set S ⊆ ω and ϕ ∈ Sent L T , let 'D(S, ϕ)' ('ϕ is determined in S') be a shorthand for: 'ϕ ∈ S ∨ ¬ϕ ∈ S'. For a formula ϕ(x) with at most one free variable let 'D(S, ϕ(x))' abbreviate '∀t ∈ T m c (ϕ(t) ∈ S ∨ ¬ϕ(t) ∈ S)'. We will use also the expression 'D(S, ϕ, ψ)' as a shorthand for 'D(S, ϕ)∧D(S, ψ)'.
It transpires that, although similar, both constructions differ in some important respects. In particular, closure ordinals of Weak and Strong Kleene model-theoretic constructions can be different.
or infinitely many ordinals in between.
Part (a) is due to Kripke (1975) ; part (b) is due to Cain and Damnjanovic (1991) . As observed by Cain and Damnjanovic, the closure ordinal of Weak Kleene model-theoretic construction depends both on the choice of coding and on the choice of the arithmetical language (namely, on the availability of the function symbols). To be more exact, if our arithmetical language is that of Peano arithmetic (with only the symbols for addition, multiplication, successor and 0 available), the closure ordinal will depend on the choice of coding. On the other hand, if our arithmetical language contains a function symbol for every primitive recursive function, then (independently of coding) the closure ordinal will be ω CK 1 .
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5 See also (Speranski, 2017) , where it is demonstrated that expanding the language of Peano arithmetic with the function symbol for subtraction already guarantees that the Weak Kleene fixed-point is reached at ω What is the impact of these non-absoluteness phenomena on axiomatic theories of truth? So far this question has received very little attention in the literature, although some partial answers have been given by Fujimoto (2010) . In this context, let us mention two important results from Fujimoto's paper.
Firstly, Theorem 50 (2) on p. 35 of the quoted paper establishes that W KF and KF have the same arithmetical consequences.
6 However, the result comes with an important limitation: Fujimoto assumes that the truth axioms of W KF are added to Peano arithmetic as formulated in the language of primitive recursive arithmetic (indeed, the availability of terms for primitive recursive functions is employed in the proof of Fujimoto's theorem). As we have seen, the choice of coding and language influences the properties of model-theoretic constructions based on Weak Kleene logic. It would be interesting to know whether (and how) these non-absoluteness phenomena influence the arithmetical strength of Weak Kleene truth axioms. At present we are not aware of any results in this direction.
Secondly, Theorem 50 (1) on p. 35 establishes that KF can define the truth predicate of W KF . This positive result does not depend on the choice of coding and language. Whatever choices are made in this respect, there will be a formula defining in KF the truth predicate satisfying the Weak Kleene axioms.
However, it has been an open question whether W KF can define the truth predicate of KF .
7 It has been also far from clear whether the unique answer to this question exists. It could happen, after all, that some versions of W KF (say, one built over the language of primitive recursive arithmetic) define the truth predicate of KF , while others do not.
Here we are going to demonstrate that the above question has the absolute negative answer. This follows immediately from Theorem 14, which is the main result of this paper. The upshot is that no matter how coding/language is chosen, W KF does not define the truth predicate of KF . Accordingly, throughout the paper we will simply assume that the arithmetical part of L T 6 Namely, it is demonstrated that the proof-theoretic strength of both theories is that of RA <ǫ0 , that is, of ramified analysis up to ǫ 0 .
7 See also (Halbach, 2011, p. 263) , where this question is explicitly stated as open. So far, the only examples suggesting that Weak Kleene based theories of truth may really be weaker than their Strong Kleene counterparts come from the analysis of typed and non-inductive versions of KF and W KF , denoted respectively as P T − and W P T − (the theories resembling KF and W KF , except that their axioms characterise truth for arithmetical sentences only and they do not contain induction for formulas with the truth predicate). Namely, in (Łełyk and Wcisło, 2018) it has been demonstrated that the theory P T − + IN T , extending P T − with the axiom of internal induction, is not truth definable in
(the language of both KF and W KF ) is fixed without stipulating what sort of terms for primitive recursive functions it contains. The coding will be also treated as fixed but arbitrary. Nevertheless, Cain's and Damnjanovic's result on closure ordinals will play an essential role in the proof to be presented.
Preliminaries
This section describes a few miscellaneous observations and results which will be useful to us later on in this paper.
We start by defining a notion of a diagonal formula. In what follows s is a numeral denoting a number s. Expressions 'x = name(y)' and 'x = sub(y, z, s)' are arithmetical formulas representing in P A the recursive relations 'x is a numeral denoting y' and 'x is the result of substituting (a term) s for (a variable) z in (a formula) y'.
Definition 8 Let ϕ(x 1 . . . x n , y) be an arbitrary formula of L T . We say that ψ(x 1 . . . x n ) is the diagonal formula for ϕ(x 1 . . . x n , y) if it is constructed in the following manner:
• Let m be the Gödel number of F (x 1 . . . x n , y),
It is a well-known fact that the equivalence of ψ(x 1 . . . x n ) with ϕ(x 1 . . . x n , ψ(x 1 . . . x n ) ) is provable already in P A as formulated in L T (the acronym P AT will be used here for this theory).
8 The next lemma states that the equivalence remains provable (in KF ) after the truth predicate is applied on both sides.
Lemma 9 Let ψ(x 1 . . . x n ) be the diagonal formula for ϕ(x 1 . . . x n , y). Then:
Proof. The assumption that ψ(x 1 . . . x n ) is the diagonal formula provides us with an exact information about its form.
9 For (b), fixing x 1 . . . x n we observe that the following conditions are provably equivalent in KF :
The equivalence of 1 and 2 holds by the definition of ψ; the second equivalence holds by the axiom of KF for negated existential statements and the fact that provably in KF , we have full disquotation for arithmetical formulas. The third equivalence holds because, provably in
The last equivalence holds by the definition of ψ.
Part (a) is proved in a very similar manner.
The following observation will be also useful.
Observation 10 Let τ (x) be a KF truth predicate in (N,
The proof is a minor modification of the familiar reasoning showing that KF proves disquotation for positive formulas. For more details, see (Halbach, 2011, p. 201) .
The next definition introduces the notion of a grounded sentence.
Definition 11 Let E be either Weak Kleene or Strong Kleene evaluation scheme. We say that a sentence ψ ∈ L T is E-grounded iff either ψ or ¬ψ belongs to T E .
9 Indeed, this piece of information is absolutely crucial. Observe that for Lemma 9 it is not enough to assume that ψ(x 1 . . . x n ) is provably equivalent (even in P AT ) to ϕ(x 1 . . . x n , ψ(x 1 . . . x n ) ). Thus, for an arbitrary sentence ϕ, P AT ⊢ (ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ) ≡ 0 = 0. Still, for many sentences ϕ (those lacking a determinate truth value) it will not be the case that KF ⊢ T (ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ) ≡ T (0 = 0).
10 A positive sentence is defined as a sentence in which every occurrence of 'T ' lies in the scope of even number of negations.
We state now the following fact.
Fact 12
ψ ∈ T and ¬ψ ∈ T ) .
Part (i) can be easily proved by ordinal induction. Parts (ii) and (iii) are well-known. Fact 12 permits us to derive the following useful corollary.
is a KF truth predicate in (N, T W K ), it is easy to observe that (N, T ) |= KF . Fixing an arbitrary WK-grounded ψ, our task is to show that (N,
Note that since ψ is WK-grounded, it is also SK-grounded by Fact 12(i).
For the implication from left to right, assume that (N,
and so (N, T ) |= T (¬ψ) by Fact 12(ii). In effect, both ψ and ¬ψ belong to T . However, this contradicts Fact 12(iii), because ψ is SK-grounded.
For the opposite implication, assume that (N,
Statement of the result. Main lemmas
In this section we state our principal theorem, formulate the main lemmas and provide the proof of one of the two lemmas.
Since (N, T W K ) |= W KF , it immediately follows that W KF does not define the truth predicate of KF . Theorem 14 will be obtained as a direct corollary from the two lemmas listed below.
Lemma 15 There are no formulas τ (x) and
Lemma 16 If (N, T W K ) defines a truth predicate of KF , then there are formulas τ (x) and G(x) satisfying the conditions (a) and (b) from Lemma 15.
Observe that Theorem 14 follows trivially from the lemmas. We now give the proof of Lemma 15. Lemma 16 will be proved in the sections to follow.
Proof of Lemma 15. Assuming that the lemma is false, define:
In other words, T r(x) is the formula stating that the result of formally substituting 'G(t) ∧ T (t)' for every occurrence of 'T (t)' in x satisfies τ .
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We now show that for every ψ ∈ Sent L T , (N, T W K ) |= T r(ψ) ≡ ψ, which contradicts Tarski's undefinability theorem, thus ending the proof. The argument proceeds by induction on the complexity of ψ. Below we consider only cases of ψ of the form T (t) or ¬T (t), since it is only here where conditions (a) and (b) from Lemma 15 are crucially used.
For ψ = T (t) , our task is to demonstrate that:
If val(t) is WK-ungrounded, then the above equivalence holds in (N, T W K ) because both sides of the equivalence are false. In other words, we have then:
is obvious on the assumption that val(t) is WK-ungrounded, so for the indirect proof let us assume that (N,
, which by condition (a) of the lemma implies that val(t) is WK-grounded and in this way a contradiction is obtained.
On the other hand, if val(t) is WK-grounded, then the following conditions are equivalent:
The first equivalence holds by the assumption (a) of the lemma. For the second equivalence, observe that if val(t) is WK-grounded, then T (t) is also WK-grounded and so by Corollary 13 we have:
, with the last condition being equivalent to (N, T W K ) |= T (t) by the axiom wkf12. For ψ = ¬T (t) , our task is to demonstrate that:
If val(t) is WK-ungrounded, then the above equivalence holds in (N, T W K ) because both sides of the equivalence are true. In other words, we have then:
. For the second conjunct (the first one is obvious) observe that by the assumption (b) of the lemma we will have then (N, T W K ) |= τ (¬G(t)) and thus (N,
If val(t) is WK-grounded, then the following conditions are equivalent:
The first equivalence holds because by the assumption (b) of the lemma (N, T W K ) τ (¬G(t)).
13 With val(t) being WK-grounded, '¬T (t)' is also
. Since val(t) is WK-grounded, the first disjunct is excluded by the assumption (b) of the lemma, hence (N, T W K ) |= τ (¬T (t)).
WK-grounded, hence the second equivalence follows immediately from Corollary 13.
Proof of Lemma 16
For the proof of Lemma 16 some additional auxiliary notions and facts will be needed. These are introduced below.
Definition 17
• x ⊳ y is an abbreviation of the following arithmetical formula:
• ⊳ * denotes the transitive closure of ⊳ (in other words, x ⊳ * y iff there is a path from y to x along the ⊳ relation),
• x y iff x ⊳ y ∨ x = y; x * y is defined in a similar manner.
• a sentence ψ ∈ L T is well-founded (wf in short) iff ⊳ is well-founded on {x : x * ψ}.
The expression 'F m ≤1
T ' used in the above definitions denotes the set of formulas of L T with at most one free variable. V ar is the set of variables.
Definition 18 For an arbitrary well-founded ψ, Ord(ψ) (the ordinal of ψ) is defined in the following manner:
Proof. Both implications are proved by ordinal induction. For the implication from left to right, fix α and assume that ∀β < α∀ψ ∈ Sent L T [ψ ∈ T W K β → ψ is well-founded]. The claim then is that ∀ψ ∈ Sent L T [ψ ∈ T W K α → ψ is well-founded]. For α being a limit ordinal, the claim follows trivially from the inductive assumption. For α of the form β + 1, the claim is also easily obtained by analysing cases from Definition 4. For example, if ψ = Qvϕ(v) , then for every t ∈ T m c , either ϕ(t) or ¬ϕ(t) belongs to T
W K β
and so by the inductive assumption for every t ∈ T m c , ϕ(t) is well-founded, from which it follows that Qvϕ(v) is well-founded.
In the proof of the opposite implication, we show that
Fixing α and assuming that this holds for every ψ such that Ord(ψ) < α, take an arbitrary sentence ψ such that Ord(ψ) = α. If α = 0, then ψ is of the form 's 1 = s 2 ' or it has the form 'T (t)' where val(t) is not a sentence. Then either ψ or ¬ψ belongs to T
W K 1
and thus ψ is WK-grounded. If α is a limit ordinal, then ψ has the form Qvϕ(v) and since by the inductive assumption all sentences of the form ϕ(t) are WK-grounded, it is easy to observe that ψ is also WK-grounded. The case of α = β + 1 is also straightforward and we leave it to the reader.
The next lemma characterises the bounds for ordinals of sentences determined as true in the Weak Kleene hierarchy.
Lemma 20
Both (a) and (b) are proved by ordinal induction, with the bulk of the proofs devoted to analysing cases.
Proof of (a). Assume that
. Our claim is that Ord(ϕ) ≥ α. From now on, the proof proceeds by considering all possible forms of ϕ. Below we discuss just two cases, leaving the rest of them to the reader.
Case 1: ϕ is of the form 'T (t)'. Since ϕ ∈ T W K α+1 , we have:
, we have also:
. Therefore α = 0 or α is a successor number of the form β + 1 (no new sentences can be added on limit levels). If α = 0, then obviously Ord(ϕ) ≥ α. If α = β + 1, then we have: val(t) ∈ T W K β+1 and val(t) / ∈ T
W K β
, so by our inductive assumption Ord(val(t)) ≥ β, hence Ord(T (t)) ≥ β + 1 as required.
Case 2: ϕ is of the form '∀xψ(x)'. Since ϕ ∈ T W K α+1 , we have: ∀t ∈ T m c ψ(t) ∈ T
W K α
. We now consider two possibilities: either (i) there is a constant term t such that ψ(t) ∈ T W K α and ψ(t) does not appear anywhere earlier in the hierarchy, or (ii) no such term exists. In the first case, α is a successor ordinal of the form β + 1, so by the inductive assumption Ord(ψ(t)) ≥ β, therefore Ord(ϕ) ≥ α and the proof is done. In the second case α must be a limit ordinal.
14 Then we obtain:
Otherwise, fixing β < α and assuming that γ with the above properties does not exist, we would have: ∀t ∈ T m c ψ(t) ∈ T W K β and thus ϕ ∈ T
, contrary to the assumption of the proof.
By the inductive assumption, it now follows that:
In effect, sup{Ord(ψ(t)) : t ∈ T m c } ≥ α and thus Ord(ϕ) ≥ α.
Proof of (b). Our inductive assumption is that ∀β
. Now, assuming that α > 0 and fixing
It is easy to observe that for every arithmetical sentence ψ (with no occurrence of the truth predicate), Ord(ϕ) < ω. Moreover, if our fixed ϕ belongs to T
W K 1
, then ϕ is either arithmetical or it is of the form 'T (t)' or '¬T (t)'. In all of these cases Ord(ϕ) < ω, hence if α = 1, then Ord(ϕ) < ω·α.
If α is a limit ordinal, the result follows trivially from the inductive assumption. So assume that α = β + 1 with β > 0. From now on, the proof proceeds by analysing all possible forms of ϕ. We will consider just two cases, leaving the rest of them to the reader.
Case 1: ϕ is of the form ¬T (t). Then val(t) is not a sentence or ¬val(t) ∈ T W K β . In the first case Ord(ϕ) = 1 and we are done. In the second case by the inductive assumption, Ord(¬val(t)) < ω · β, hence Ord(¬T (t)) < ω · (β + 1).
Case 2: ϕ is of the form ∀xψ(x). Then for all t ∈ T m c , ψ(t) ∈ T
W K β
and so by the inductive assumption ∀t ∈ T m c Ord(ψ(t)) < ω · β. Since by definition Ord(ϕ) = sup{Ord(ψ(t)) : t ∈ T m c }, we have: Ord(ϕ) ≤ ω · β. Therefore Ord(ϕ) < ω · (β + 1), which means that Ord(ϕ) < ω · α.
Observation 21
14 If α were equal to β + 1, then by (ii) we would have: ∀t ∈ T m c ψ(t) ∈ T W K β and thus ϕ ∈ T W K α , contrary to the main assumption of the proof.
Proof. Part (a) follows directly from the definition of ⊳ * . For an indirect proof of (b), assume that Ord(s) = α and let β < α be such that ¬∃s ′ ⊳ * s Ord(s ′ ) = β. Choose the least ordinal γ such that γ > β and ∃s ′ * s Ord(s ′ ) = γ (such an ordinal exists because α satisfies both conditions). Fixing s ′ such that Ord(s ′ ) = γ, we obtain:
Since γ > β, we have: γ = 0. We observe that γ cannot be a successor number, because if γ = δ + 1, then δ ∈ {Ord(s ′′ ) : s ′′ ⊳ s ′ }, which contradicts the choice of γ as the least ordinal with the stipulated property. It follows that γ is a limit ordinal. Therefore there is an ordinal δ > γ and s ′′ such that Ord(s ′′ ) = δ and s ′′ ⊳ s ′ , which again contradicts the choice of γ.
The next two sections contain a proof by cases of Lemma 16. Assuming that (N, T W K ) defines a truth predicate of KF , we take into account the possible closure ordinals of (N, T W K ) (see Definition 6). By Theorem 7 there are two possibilities: either this ordinal is smaller than ω CK 1 or it is ω CK 1 . It transpires that in both cases Lemma 16 can be proved, although the means used in the proofs are quite different.
Case 1:
The key observation is that in this case ordinals of well-founded sentences can be restricted by a fixed number below ω CK 1 .
Observation 22 ∃κ
< ω CK 1 ∀ψ ∈ Sent L T ψ is well-founded → Ord(ψ) < κ .
Proof.
Let α be the closure ordinal of (N, T W K ). Define κ as ω · α. Since α < ω CK 1 , so is κ. Let ψ be well-founded, so by Lemma 19 either ψ or its negation belongs to T W K β for some β < α. Then by Lemma 20(b), Ord(ψ) < ω · β and thus Ord(ψ) < κ.
The proof of Lemma 16 employs the following theorem.
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Theorem 23 (Kripke 1975 ) Let S be an arbitrary set of natural numbers. The following conditions are equivalent:
In view of Theorem 23, it is enough to show that the set of WK-grounded sentences (that is, the set of well-founded sentences) is ∆ 1 1 .
Lemma 24
The set of sentences well-founded in (N,
Proof. The Π 1 1 formulation is straightforward. For starters, define 'X is a path on y' as the conjunction of the following four arithmetical formulas with one second-order free variable:
Then we can express the well-foundedness of an arbitrary ψ by means of the following Π 1 1 formula:
∀X[X is a path on ψ → ∃n∀x ∈ Xx < n]. ∃f ∃α < κ f is a surjection mapping {x :
Note that since κ < ω CK 1 , we can treat the quantification over ordinals as quantification over ordinal notations. Now we immediately obtain the proof of Lemma 16.
Proof of Lemma 16
Let τ (x) be a KF truth predicate in (N, T W K ). By Lemma 24 and Theorem 23, let G(x) be a formula total in (N, T SK ) such that the set of WK-grounded sentences can be characterised as {ψ : (N, T SK ) |= T (G(ψ))}. The totality condition means that for every t, the formula 'G(t)' is SK-grounded and so the conditions (a) and (b) of Lemma 16 follow easily from Fact 12(ii) and (iii).
Case 2:
In this case, the reasoning from the previous subsection is clearly inapplicable, since by Lemma 20(a) we cannot restrict the ordinals of well-founded formulas by any ordinal below ω CK 1 . In effect, our strategy here will be quite different. Indeed, now the proof of Lemma 16 is based on the insight that well-founded sentences form a structure which is complex enough to permit us (in the presence of the KF truth predicate) to reconstruct in (N, T W K ) various Strong Kleene model-theoretic constructions, including the Kripkean construction of the least fixed-point model.
Let us start by the following definition. Intuitively, the formula 'ψ(s, x)' defined below is designed to express that x is a sentence determined as true at the ordinal level s of the Strong Kleene least fixed-point construction. However, ultimately instead of ordinals we will be using the well-founded sentences of L T .
Definition 25 Let ψ be the diagonal formula satisfying (provably in PAT) the condition:
In what follows we assume that τ (x) is a KF truth predicate in (N, T W K ). Denoting by 'F (s, x)' the formula on the right side of the biconditional in Definition 25, we obtain the following corollary:
Corollary 26
The first part follows by Lemma 9, the second by Observation 10 and the fact that ψ(s, x) is positive. In effect, when working in (N, T W K ), we can always move freely between 'τ (ψ(s, x))' and the result of substituting 'τ (t)' for all the occurrences of 'T (t)' in 'F (s, x)'.
We write 's ∈ D' (s is determined) as an abbreviation of 'T (s) ∨ T (¬s)'. We denote by 'D W K ' the set of WK-grounded sentences. Now we formulate the following basic observation.
Proof. For the implication from right to left, observe that since τ (x) is a KF truth predicate, for any ϕ ∈ T h(N) we will have (N,
. Then by Corollary 26 together with the definition of ψ(s, x) it follows that (N, T W K ) |= τ (ψ(s, ϕ)). For the opposite implication, let α be the least ordinal such that for some s we have:
. By considering all possible forms of the formula ϕ we note that there has to be an s ′ ⊳ s such that for some sentence χ /
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But then Ord(s ′ ) < α, which contradicts the choice of α.
The next lemma establishes the monotonicity of ψ under τ .
Lemma 28 ∀ss
Proof. Fix an ordinal α and assume that the lemma is true below α, that is:
We claim that ∀ss
The proof proceeds by considering cases. For illustration we present below three of them; the reasoning in the remaining cases is very similar. Case 1: ϕ ∈ Sent L P A . Then the conclusion follows by Observation 27. Case 2: ϕ = (¬)T (t). Then (N, T W K ) |= ∃s 1 ⊳ s τ (ψ(s 1 , (¬)val(t))). Fixing such an s 1 , we observe that Ord(s 1 ) < α. By Observation 21(b), choose s 2 ⊳ * s ′ such that Ord(s 2 ) = Ord(s 1 ). Then by the inductive assumption we obtain (N,
. By Observation 21(a), choose s 3 ⊳ s ′ such that s 2 * s 3 . Then again by the inductive assumption we obtain (N, 
The lemma below establishes a connection between the behaviour of ψ under τ and Kripke's hierarchy from Definition 5.
We claim that the same holds also for α.
. If α = β + 1, the proof proceeds by analysing possible forms of ϕ. Thus, e.g.:
Case 1. ϕ = T (t). Assuming that ϕ ∈ T SK β+1 , we obtain: , ϕ) ). The proof of the opposite implication is very similar.
Case 2. ϕ = Qvχ(v). Assuming that ϕ ∈ T SK β+1 , we obtain: Qa(χ(a) ∈ T SK β ). As before, choosing s ′ ⊳ s such that Ord(s ′ ) = β we obtain:
). Again, the proof of the opposite implication is very similar. We leave the other cases to the reader.
If α is a limit ordinal, we argue as follows. Assuming that ϕ ∈ T SK α , take , ϕ) ). For the opposite implication, assuming that (N, T W K ) |= τ (ψ(s, ϕ)), we consider possible forms of ϕ.
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The proof then proceeds by cases. Since the argument in each case is very similar, we restrict ourselves to giving one example, leaving the rest for the reader to verify. Thus, assume that ϕ = ¬T (t). Then (N,
. If the first disjunct holds, it follows immediately that ϕ ∈ T SK α . If the second, choose an s ′ with the indicated property and let Ord(s ′ ) = β. Since β < α, by the inductive assumption we obtain: ¬val(t) ∈ T SK β and since α is a limit ordinal, we can take an ordinal γ and an s ′′ ⊳ s such that Ord(s ′′ ) = γ, γ > β and γ < α. Then ¬T (t) ∈ T SK γ and thus ¬T (t) ∈ T SK α .
Corollary 30 If τ (x)
is an arbitrary KF truth predicate in (N, For the proof of Lemma 16, we assume that we have at our disposal a KF truth predicate. Our task is to show the existence of a KF truth predicate which can 'recognize' Weak Kleene groundedness in the sense of conditions (a) and (b) of Lemma 15. For this we need to define a formula G(x) expressing groundedness. We introduce such a formula below.
Definition 31 Let ϕ(x, y) be defined as ∃z ⊳ x∃s s = sub(y, x , z)∧T (s) . Define θ(x) as the diagonal formula for ϕ(x, y) (for the details of the construction, see Definition 8).
In particular, P AT proves that:
Now, our G(x) is defined as ¬θ(x). Let us start with the following observation.
Proof. The proof proceeds by ordinal induction. Assume that for every β < α and for every ψ ∈ Sent L T , if ψ is WK-grounded and Ord(ψ) = β, then (N, T SK ) |= T (¬θ(ψ)). Let ψ be WK-grounded such that Ord(ψ) = α. We claim that (N, T SK ) |= T (¬θ(ψ)). By Lemma 9(b), it is enough to demonstrate that (N, T SK ) |= T (¬∃z ⊳ ψ T (θ(z))), which in turn is equivalent in (N, T SK ) to '∀z z ⊳ ψ → T (¬θ(z)) '.
Fixing z ⊳ ψ, we notice that z is WK-grounded and Ord(z) < α. Therefore by the inductive assumption (N, T SK ) |= T (¬θ(z)) and thus the proof is finished.
At this moment we see that already the least fixed-point model of KF is able to recognize Weak Kleene groundedness, but only in a restricted sense: if the sentence ψ is WK-grounded, then the model will classify G(ψ) -that is, ¬θ(ψ) -as determinately true. However, in case of ψ being WK-ungrounded, the least fixed-point model of KF is not able to recognize G(ψ) as determinately false. In effect, the condition (b) from Lemma 15 is still not satisfied. Below we are going to show how to remedy this defect. Let us start with the following definition.
Definition 33
• T is added in the definition also at successor levels. This is done in order to guarantee the full monotonicity of the construction.
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The properties of T θ are encapsulated in the following observation.
Observation 34 (N, T θ ) |= KF and for every ψ ∈ Sent L T :
(a) ψ is WK-grounded iff (N, T θ ) |= T (¬θ(ψ)), (b) ψ is WK-ungrounded iff (N, T θ ) |= T (θ(ψ)).
In view of Observation 34, in the proof of Lemma 16 it is enough to demonstrate that if (N, T W K ) defines a truth predicate of KF , then it defines also T θ .
Proof of Lemma 16
Assume that (N, T W K ) defines a truth predicate of KF . By Corollary 30, let τ (x) be a formula defining in (N, T W K ) the set of sentences determined as true in the least fixed-point model of KF .
Define:
Then τ Compl (x) defines in (N, T W K ) the set of sentences determined as true in the largest fixed-point model of KF .
19 Observe that in the largest fixed-point model (N, T Compl ) of KF , all sentences ¬θ(t) for val(t) being WK-grounded will belong to T Compl (this is because by Observation 32 they belong already to T SK ); moreover, in such cases by Fact 12(iii) θ(t) does not belong to T Compl . On the other hand, if val(t) is not WK-grounded, then both θ(t) and ¬θ(t) belongs to T Compl .
18 Defining T θ α+1
as J SK (T θ α ) would bring a minor technical complication:
given that θ(t) ∈ T θ 0 , why should it belong also to T θ 1 ? As defined earlier (cf.
Definitions 31 and 8), θ(t) is the formula: ∃ab[a = name(m) ∧ b = sub(m, y , a) ∧ ∃z ⊳ t∃s s = sub(b, x , z) ∧ T (s) ]. Clearly, already T θ 0 will contain witnessing statements (with fixed a, b, z and s) for the arithmetical part of this existential formula. In other words, in T θ 0 we will have (for fixed a, b, z and s) a = name(m) ∧ b = sub(m, y , a) ∧ z ⊳ t ∧ s = sub(b, x , z), with s also belonging to T θ 0 and identical to θ(z). However, this in itself is not enough to guarantee that the Strong Kleene jump applied to T θ 0 will produce θ(t). 19 This has been observed in a more general form by Cantini (1989) . Let Con be the statement '∀ψ¬ T (ψ) ∧ T (¬ψ) ' and let Compl be the statement '∀ψ T (ψ) ∨ T (¬ψ) '. The general observation is that given a model (N, T ) of KF +Con, a model (N, T ′ ) of KF +Compl can be obtained by defining T ′ as the set of those sentences of L T whose negations do not belong to T .
